RELIGION, PARTY POLITICS AND ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

RELIGION, PARTY  POLITICS AND ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: A HISTORICAL REVIEW 

By Rikwense Muri 

Studying history enables us to develop better understanding of the world in which we live. Building knowledge and understanding of historical events and trends, especially over the past century, enables us to develop a much greater appreciation for current events today.  Studying history helps us understand and grapple with complex questions and dilemmas by examining how the past has shaped (and continues to shape) global, national, and local relationships between societies and people. 

The purpose of this study is to enlighten people especially political stakeholders from Taraba State to be mindful of the resurgence of religious narratives in our volatile political arena sponsored by the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Taraba State Chapter and the Taraba State Muslim Council to polarize our people towards 2023 elections. Knowing the role religion have played in our political history will shape our response and approach towards the influence of our religious leaders in our political history.  Because history gives us the tools to analyze and explain problems in the past, it positions us to see patterns that might otherwise be invisible in the present – thus providing a crucial perspective for understanding (and solving!) current and future problems. 

Special appreciation to Prof. Hakeem Anapajo for his 2015 work  "POLITICS  AND THE PULPIT: The Rise and Decline of Religion in Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Elections," which formed major part of this  study and findings to guide us in the political arena. 

Studies have proven that Nigerians are amongst the most religious people in the world. A Global Attitudes Survey by the Pew Research Center in 2015, revealed that Nigerians  are the ninth most religious  peoples  in the  world,  with 88%  positive responses from them that ‘religion plays a very important role in their lives’. Similarly, a 2005 survey conducted by the BBC World Service found that 85% of Nigerians ‘trusted religious leaders and a similar proportion were willing to  give them  more power’.  With  Christianity and Islam as the most widely recognised  religions  in Nigeria, mosques  and churches  are a common sight on every street throughout the country.

Given  its  effectiveness  in identity formation, political mobilisation, and  regime legitimacy, religion has been highly  entrenched in Nigerian politics. This is more visible during election seasons  as  politicians  characteristically,  but deceptively,  make use of religious  rhetoric  as  a powerful instrument to  mobilise voters, which has often led to incidents of religious conflict. 

This may be the reason why many believe  that Africans are the only race that is ready and willing to sacrifice meritocracy, National development and progress to favour protection of tribal and religious loyalty despite the recycling consequences before us since independence. Many African societies are yet to proof the the statement accredited to the former South African Apartheid leader Pieter Willem Botha, "Black people cannot rule themselves because they don’t have the brain and mental capacity to govern a society … Give them guns, they would kill themselves; Give them power, they will steal all the government money; Give them independence and democracy; they will use it to promote tribalism, ethnicity, bigotry, hatred, killings, and wars!” 

Religion has played a major role right from the early days of elections in Nigeria. This  is  more  apparent  in  the  northern  part  of  the  country,  given  the  influential role religion plays in its social system. Religion took a central role in the ideology and  membership  profile  of  the  first  political  parties  that  emerged  in  the  1950s, following  the  concession of  the colonial  government  to the nationalists’  demands for wider political participation. The three major northern political parties that  emerged  –  the  Northern  People’s  Congress  (NPC),  the  Northern  Elements Progressive  Union  (NEPU)  and  the  United  Middle  Belt  Congress  (UMBC)  – displayed a religious character. This was especially true of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), which was the most popular party in the region  and was heavily  influenced  by  Islam.  According  to  Dudley  (1968,  p.143),  the  party’s  ‘Islamic influence  in  winning  mass  support  can  hardly  be  underestimated’  because  the party itself was under the leadership of Muslim leaders including Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto and founder of Jama’atu Nasril Islam) and Sultan of Sokoto (the de-facto leader of Nigerian Muslims who was the patron of the party). 

Furthermore, according to Dudley the party was seen as representing a consensus of the Muslim community  (Ijma), and refusal to accept the consensus of the community is considered heretical according to Islamic principles. Thus it is not surprising that the party enjoyed tremendous support among the Muslim majority, and for this reason consistently won a majority of the parliamentary seats in the pre- and post-independence elections.

 The  NEPU,  although  it  was  the  first  political  party  in  northern  Nigeria,  later became the strongest opposition to  the NPC  in  the Muslim-populated areas  of  the northern region. Its  major aim  was  the creation of a pro-masses  social structure that would challenge the reign of the Fulani aristocrats, thus claiming the identity of a party representing the interest of the  Talakawa  (the down-trodden) of society. Given that the NPC was associated with the upper strata of the Muslim-dominated society, the NEPU drew its membership from the lower class, mostly constituting the teachers of the local  Madrasah  and members of the  Tijjaniyyah  brotherhood –  facilitated  by  the  historical  conflict  between  the  Qadriyyah  (with  historical connection to the Sultanate of Sokoto under Usman dan Fodio) and  Tijjaniyyah (led  by  the  Emir  of  Kano  Alhaji  Muhammadu  Sanusi)  Sufi  brotherhoods. Indeed,  this  generated  increased  intra-religious  conflicts  and,  most especially, the state persecution of prominent  Tijjanniyah  members. It  was in the midst  of  this  crisis  that  the  Emir  of  Kano  was  compelled  to  resign  from  office  and forced into exile in 1963. 

Another major party  opposed to the dominance of the NPC was the United Middle Best Congress (UMBC) whose emergence was conspicuously driven by Christians in the non-Muslim areas, otherwise known as the Middle Belt region. The party was a product of the protest associations and parties created by Christians in the Middle Belt against a perceived Hausa-Fulani Islamic hegemony especially through the instrumentality of the NPC. The UMBC emerged  following the merger of the Middle Zone League (MZL) and Middle Belt People’s Party (MBPP). These parties derived their sources from the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League created with the aid of Christian missions ‘to counter Islamic expansionist moves’ . Thus, the UMBC, according to an NPC member, ‘is only an ideology infused by the Christian missionaries against  the  expansion  of  the  Moslems  in  Northern  Nigeria’. 

Expectedly, this  gave the party some electoral advantage in the Christianpopulated parts of the northern region. Indeed,  the  influence  of  religion  in  the  party  formation  and  voting  pattern was not restricted to northern Nigeria. Kukah and Falola (1996, p.87) showed that a Muslim party, the United Muslim Party (UMP), was established in Lagos in 1953 with the aim of contesting  elections and to wrest power from the ruling Action Group (AG). However, the party was not successful in its ambition as it was  unable to  attract established  Muslim  politicians  in  the  AG to  its  fold. For  this reason, the party could not win any seats in the 1954, 1956 and 1959 elections. In 1957  Muslims formed another political  party,  the  National  Muslim  League  (NML), in protest against the perceived anti-Islamic activities of the AG’s government in the western region.

 Given the NML  mission and  increasing popularity amongst Muslims in the western region, the AG actually felt threatened by its existence, which was considered capable of reducing the electoral support of the  ruling  party, particularly in the 1959 general elections. The NML, having changed its name to National Emancipation League (NEL) following criticisms of its use of religion for political mobilisation, entered into an alliance with the NPC. According to Kukah and Falola (1996, p.90), even though the party was unable to  neutralise the dominance of the AG, given its failure in the 1959 elections, it was able to represent a formidable opposition to Awolowo’s AG in the western region. 

In the Second Republic religion did  not disappear from  electoral politics.  This was despite attempts by the government to discourage religion-driven parties with the constitutional provision that no political party could carry the identity of any ethnic or religious groups. It should be recalled that the Second Republic was preceded by an intense debate over the inclusion of a provision for a Federal Sharia  Court of  Appeal  in  the  draft constitution  at Constitutional  Assembly in 1977/78, which culminated in major rivalry between Muslims and Christians. Clearly, this environment created an avenue for the manipulation of religious texts  and  for the faithful to  garner votes. The most popular parties, including the National People’s Party (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), People’s Redemption Party (PRP), and the Nigeria’s  People’s  Party (NPP), were associated with either Christianity or Islam. For example, the NPN, being a duplication of the old NPC, was seen as a product of the aristocratic Fulani Muslims in the north because of the nature of its leadership and popular base. The PRP was associated with the Tijjaniyyah  brotherhood given its closeness to the old NEPU, while it gained its electoral strength in Kano and Kaduna with a considerably higher presence of the brotherhood. The UPN and NPP were perceived more as Christian parties owing  to  their  leadership  and  areas  of  influence  (Oloyede  1987).  It  should  be noted, however, that in the western region there were notable Muslims  in the UPN and also Christians in the NPN, as the Yoruba are known for a liberal approach towards both Christianity and Islam. Yet it was still a prevalent perception in some sections among the Yoruba that UPN was antiIslam.  For  example,  Muslim  members  of  the  NPN  in  Oyo  State  were  proficient at using campaign slangs and songs to discourage Muslims from voting for the UPN,  following  their  classification  of  that  party  as  leading  to  Jahannum  (hell-fire). In the eastern region the church campaigned vigorously for NPP which greatly contributed to the party’s success in the region. 

In the Third  Republic, research indicates  that there was  some religious dimension to the political  process.  This  was  despite  the  popular  belief  that religion had  been  insignificant  in  the  1993  presidential  elections  following  the  MuslimMuslim ticket (Muslim presidential and vice-presidential candidates) advanced by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was massively supported at the ballot box across the country. It was reported that Christians under the banner of the Christian Association of  Nigeria (CAN) in the  north  actually threatened to boycott the elections if the candidates presented by  the SDP and National Republican Convention (NRC) were Muslims. For this reason, some Christian presidential aspirants (including S.L Slifu, a former Secretary-General of the northern branch of CAN, and Jerry Gana) were encouraged to join the race chiefly  to  challenge  the  Muslim  aspirants.  However,  they  were  unable  to  succeed  at the primaries.  Furthermore, after the military regime annulled the presidential election won by Moshood Abiola, it was reported that Yoruba Muslims  actually lobbied  the  Hausa-Fulani Muslims  requesting the  Sultan  of Sokoto  to  use  the  influence  of  his  office  to  condemn  the  annulment. Rather than condemn the act, the Sultan, Ibrahim Dasuki, only urged Abiola to ‘accept the annulment as “an act of God". 

The transition programme initiated by  General Abdulsalami Abubakar in 1998 kick-started a journey into the Fourth Republic. The new republic, just like the previous ones, has not been devoid of religion during elections. Clearly, this can be meaningfully connected to the politics around the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo  as  President in  1999.  The  emergence  of  Obasanjo,  a  southern Christian, was the outcome of an agreement amongst the political elite, spearheaded by the  northern  military  leaders  and  influential  political  elite.    This  was  to  pacify the Yoruba after the injustice done to  Abiola over the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections  and  his  subsequent incarceration, which led to  his  death in prison in 1998. Shortly after Obasanjo assumed power, the northern Muslim elite suspected  attempts  to  Christianise the presidency by his  Christian aides  and certain groups close to him. This group of people, dubbed the ‘Theocratic Class’ by  Ebenezer  Obadare (2006),  was  driven  by  the  increasingly  influential  Pentecostal Church. They gave President Obasanjo the image of a ‘born-again’ president and defined  him  as  ‘a  personal  embodiment  of  divine  response  to  their  prayers  and prophecies for the nation’. According to some, the fear nurtured by the northern Muslims over this development was partly responsible for the introduction of the  Sharia  system in twelve states of the Muslim-majority areas in the north with the aim of countering the apparent moves of an emergent Christian power bloc. 

The northern elites further advanced vehement moves to wrest power from the southern Christians. This move reached a crescendo after the sudden death of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2010 who was unable to complete his term as the president. His death necessitated  the succession of his  southern Christian vicepresident, Goodluck Jonathan, as the president in 2010, in accordance with the Nigerian  constitution.    Jonathan  later  ran  for  presidential  office  and  won  in  2011. It  is  instructive  that  Jonathan’s  decision  to  stand  for  the  office  of  president  was met with total resistance from the northern politicians who saw the move as a violation of an existing zoning formula in the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which was supposed to favour a northern candidate. It was also more upsetting for the northern politicians that  Jonathan was strongly  supported by former President Obasanjo,  who  had  gathered  enough  power  to  exert  tremendous  influence  in  the PDP and in the country. 

Therefore, this situation was used as a reason to mobilise Muslims in the north against Jonathan’s candidature in the 2011 elections after he defeated Atiku Abubakar,  who was seemingly the ‘Northern Consensus Candidate’ at the PDP primaries (Onapajo 2012). The religionisation of the 2011 electoral process was further strengthened by the emergence of Muhammadu Buhari as  the presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Buhari, who had been labelled a Muslim fundamentalist  by  his opponents because of his positive remarks on the  Sharia legal system and his Islamic devotion, enjoyed obsessive following by Muslim youth and clerics, not only in the north but also in the southern region. Therefore, ensuring the success of his presidential ambition was considered a religious duty. To that extent, any act of opposition to Buhari’s candidature by a Muslim was even considered heretical by some Muslim leaders and groups. 

Goodluck Jonathan also created for himself the image of an oppressed Christian who needed the support of his brethren to win the presidential election. He  regularly  attended  church  programmes  in  order  to  identify  himself  with the large Christian population and mobilise votes to realise his ambition. The most notable  was  his  visit in  December  2010  to  an  annual  event of  the  Redeemed Christian  (Pentecostal)  Church,  ‘The  Holy  Ghost  Night’,  which  provides  an avenue for one of the largest Christian gatherings in Nigeria. He knelt before the church’s  highly  influential  pastor,  Pastor  Enoch  Adeboye,  ostensibly  to  pray  for the nation,  but in fact to  advance  his  political  ambition.  Some  other  church pastors also conspicuously campaigned  for him  in their churches. For example, it was reported  that a  Lagos-based  Pentecostal  pastor,  Paul  Adefarasin,  of  the  House on the Rock Church, urged his followers to unanimously support a Christian presidential candidate in the 2011 elections.  

Therefore,  the  2011  presidential  election  seemed  to  be  a  major contest between a  Christian  and  Muslim  candidate.  The  pattern  of  voting  clearly  confirmed  this assertion as  it was  apparently characterised  by the Christian-Muslim  divide in the country. In the Christian-dominated areas of the south and the Middle Belt, Jonathan had a landslide victory over Buhari. On the other hand, Buhari was overwhelmingly voted for in the Muslim-dominated areas consisting of twelve states: Sokoto, Zamfara, Niger, Kano, Kebbi, Katsina, Bauchi, Kaduna, Jigawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe. Though the result was controversial, Jonathan garnered a total 22 495 187 (58.89%) votes in 23 states of the federation over Buhari’s 12 214 853 (31.98%) which earned  him  victory (http://www.inecnigeria.org). Violent protests  against this election outcome by youths  in the north according to International Crisis Group, resulted in the deaths of about 800 people as well as arson attacks on worship centres. 

In 2015, electoral politics were clearly an extension of the politics of the 2011 elections. The loss of that contest to Goodluck Jonathan reinforced the determination of the northern Muslims to ensure the emergence of someone from their community as the president in the 2015 elections. This agenda was easily adopted by other Muslims across the country as Jonathan’s government was increasingly seen as biased towards his Christian brethren. This is judged by his closeness to notable Christian leaders, especially Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor (the President of the CAN), who  were regularly visible at the presidential villa and  also  wielded  much  political  influence.  Muslims  also  felt  aggrieved  by  some policies of the government which were seen to be marginalising them. A notable example  was their disenchantment with the composition of the National Political Reform Conference held in 2014, which had an unbalanced number of Muslim representatives  in  comparison  with  their  Christian counterparts. 

 This  triggered a protest visit by the Muslim community, led by the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar, to President Jonathan in March 2014 to lodge a formal complaint about the situation (Premium  Times, 26 March 2014). Although Jonathan assuaged their feelings, denying  any deliberate attempt to marginalise the community and promising that the imbalance would be corrected, the Muslim community felt  deceived  and  aggrieved  that  no  substantial  effort  was  made  by  the government to address their concerns. This is clear in the following statement by Ishaq Oloyede, the Secretary-General of the National Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), that: "The Muslim community met with the then president [Jonathan]. He  saw  that  the  composition  was  flawed.  He  admitted  that  it  was an error and promised heaven and earth. He never did anything to rectify the error."  

Boko  Haram  violence  is  another  prominent issue  that has  contributed  to  the religionisation of  the 2015 electoral politics. This is because violence takes the  form of  religious  terrorism  when the Boko  Haram  group  claims  to  be  on  a mission to Islamise Nigeria, based on its own interpretation of Islam. A major consequence  of  the  Boko  Haram  attacks, therefore,  is  the  deterioration  of  an already bitter Christian-Muslim relationship in the country. On the one hand, Christians perceive the Boko Haram insurgents as a sort  of ‘Muslim army’ that aims to actualise a long-term Muslim agenda to Islamise Nigeria. In addition, some Christian leaders alleged that the entire incidence of Boko Haram was actually orchestrated by northern Muslims in order to force a Christian president out of power against the backdrop of the 2011 elections. Thus, they consistently claim that  Christians and churches are the main targets of the deadly group. 

On the other hand, a popular view within the Muslim community was that Boko Haram was a plot by Christians to tarnish the image of Islam and of the Muslim  elites  who  were opposed  to  Jonathan’s  presidency. They claimed  that many incidents of Boko Haram attacks had been discovered to be connected to Christians  and their leadership. Furthermore, some Muslims  claimed  that there was  a ‘Federal Government Boko  Haram’, suggesting that Jonathan’s  presidency was behind some Boko Haram-related attacks aimed at preventing voting in the largely Muslim-dominated North  East, in order to decimate the electoral chances of the Muslim candidate. Indeed, this  altercation nearly pushed  the country to the brink of a religious war as the leadership of both religious groups threatened reprisal attacks against each other. 

Clearly, this political climate created a major religious division which was useful  to  the  political  elite  in  preparation  for  the  elections.  This  made  religion  a very useful tool in the hands of the political elites in the electoral process. The following sub-sections provide an analysis of how the political elite went about using religion as  an instrument for voter mobilisation in the pre-election period.

Despite the pervasiveness of religion in this pre-election period, one cannot successfully argue that religion was a major factor in the voting pattern. The Muslim-dominated northern areas in the North East and North West did vote massively for Buhari, while the largely Christian areas in the South East and South South voted predominantly for Jonathan, and this has something of an ethnic dimension. The pattern of voting in two  major geo-political zones with a large Christian population, North Central and South West, is instructive for  analysis  here.  In the  North  Central,  which is  mostly composed  of the  northern Christian-populated  states  –  Benue,  Plateau,  Nasarawa  and  Kogi  States  –  the APC candidate beat the PDP candidate by over 25%.  This is unexpected in those areas  especially when considering the votes  Jonathan (as  a Christian candidate) recorded there in the 2011 elections). In addition, when considering the  results  at  state  levels  it  is  striking that  in  Benue  and  Kogi  States,  Buhari earned more votes  than Jonathan by 18.8%  and  43.3%  respectively. In some other predominantly  Christian-populated states, including Plateau and Taraba where Jonathan recorded more votes, the margin was surprisingly narrow (22% and 16% respectively).  Also  in the  South West,  with a seemingly mixed  population of Muslims and Christians, there was a margin of 25.1% in favour of the APC candidate. With this result, there is reason to suggest that factors other than religion played significant roles in the voting choice of the people. 

Two reasons  may account for this  pattern of voting which saw a reduced  role of religion:

 Firstly, pre-election surveys conducted in some states that produced surprising outcomes, as indicated above, clearly show that despite attempts at politicising their worship centres, voters’ decisions were based on the performance records of the presidential candidates, especially on issues  concerning security, corruption, and  employment. For example, a number of Christians  in Plateau State  interviewed  in  a  BBC  report  suggested  that  the  religious  affiliation  of  the candidate would not be primary in their voting decisions; rather their credibility would  be a major determinant. According to a Christian voter, ‘If the Christian leader does not have what it takes to provide good leadership, I will not vote for him merely because he is a Christian’. Another respondent  stated that ‘… the way things are going people are beginning to downplay the role of religion in deciding who you vote.  I  hear  people talking a  lot about credibility’.

 It should be noted  that the Jonathan administration in particular lost its popularity following its poor management of Boko Haram violence and other related  ethno-religious  violence  in  the  northern  region,  which  significantly  affected his fellow Christians. On the other hand, there were increased expectations that Buhari, as a retired general in the Nigerian Army with a record of dealing with similar  terrorist groups  in  the 1980s  as  a  military head-of-state,2  would  handle the situation better.

 Furthermore, Jonathan lost credibility in the face of a deluge of corruption allegations  against his  cabinet members, about which he was passive. A good example is the allegation made by the Governor of the Central Bank of  Nigeria,  Sanusi Lamido  Sanusi, that a  sum  of USD  20  billion from  the oil revenue account went missing on the watch of the Minister of Petroleum, Diezani Alison-Madueke. Rather than institute a convincing investigation into the allegation, President Jonathan  suspended  the  whistle-blower  (Sanusi Lamido) on some fabricated  charges. On the other hand, Buhari was  seen not only as  being personally free of corruption but also as an anti-corruption crusader because of his record  as  the  military  head  of  state  between  1983  and  1985,  when  he  significantly addressed the problem of corruption and all forms of indiscipline in the country through the policy of ‘War Against Indiscipline’ (WAI).  

Secondly, the campaign strategy of the PDP against the APC candidate based  on his  personality and  religion  was  apparently counter-productive,  as  it ended up pitting one religion against the other. This strategy was considered inflammatory as  it  could  have  pushed  the  country  to  the  point  of  a  religious  war. 

This position is also admitted by the leadership of the PDP after it was accused by the campaign team of causing Jonathan’s failure at the elections. The Publicity Secretary of the party responded that: "We (National Working Committee) did not lead the party to failure. We were not involved in the  campaigns and our advice was ignored … in 2003, President Obasanjo ran an election against OdumegwuOjukwu in the South-East. In 2007, Yar’Adua ran election against Ojukwu. I can tell you, if PDP had engaged in name calling or abused Ojukwu in any way, PDP would have lost the elections in the  South-East."

 This shows that Nigerian voters  are  gradually becoming more  sophisticated.  With the outcome of the 2015 presidential elections, one can argue that the inclination to vote for visceral reasons may  be on the decline. More voters displayed their preference for the performance capacity of the presidential candidates, rather than their religious or ethnic backgrounds. In a  liberal democracy, a quality and rational voter is certainly a useful criterion for the development of democracy.

 That may be the  why the 2019 elections had little emphasis on religion but on performance of the incumbent, security, job creation and national integration. Although one may argue that religion played a little role in 2019 because both candidates of APC and PDP were muslims from the north, the reality of the matter is religion is loosing its grip in the political arena in Nigeria looking at the fact that the leadership which emerged on the basis of their religion have not impacted much in the society as expected. Many are disappointed in those who won elections on the basis of religion or ethnicity. To me this is progress.

Although this does not necessarily indicate the death of identity factors in elections, it suggests that incumbents and parties will pay more attention to delivering on their mandate in order to be re-elected, rather than having an easy path into office courtesy of their religion or ethnicity. 

CONCLUSION 

Nigeria’s  status  as  one of  the most religious  countries  in  the world  ensures  that the connection between its religion and politics is relevant to the literature on this subject.  The  involvement of  religion  in  Nigerian  politics  relates  to  its  use  as  an instrument for mobilising votes in elections. As shown in this study, the history of Nigeria is replete with the invocation of religious sentiments for electoral gains. Clearly,  the  2015  presidential  elections  provide  another  significant  example  of how  the  political  elite  attempt  to  manipulate  religion  and  influence  the  faithful to gather votes and win elections. As such, this study of the politics around the elections is about how the faithful were mobilised at their places of worship in order to win the elections. This was clearly manifested in the campaign strategies of  the  major  contestants  for  presidential  office.  Furthermore,  by  analysing  the voting patterns, this paper demonstrates that despite this strategy, religious sentiments  had  minimal  effect  on  the  voting  choice  of  the  electorate.  The  voters instead  made  their  choice  based  on  the  performance  records  of  the  presidential candidates.  This  has  positive implications  for  democratic development  in  Nigeria. It shows that the voters are indeed becoming more rational and less sentimental at the polling station, despite the manipulations of political elites. 

Amb Rikwense Muri  

He is currently the National Director, sponsorship and Collaboration, Polling Units Ambassadors of Nigeria (PUAN). He hails from Taraba State. 

07035238019, rikmuri@gmail.com